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1 Introduction
Two-sided platform firms cater to two distinct groups of customers that are
connected through quantity spillovers, and the firms maximize profit by fa-
cilitating value-creating interactions between these groups.1 Two-sided plat-
forms operate in many economically significant industries, such as the media
sector, the financial sector (payment card systems), real-estate brokerage,
and the computing industry (computer operating systems, software, game
consoles etc.). The pricing strategies of a platform firm must account for
interactions between the demands of diﬀerent customer groups and the ex-
ternalities that arise in these relationships. For instance, in the credit card
industry there are positive quantity spillovers between merchants and card-
holders. Merchants who accept a credit card value an increase in the number
of households joining the credit card system, and vice versa.
We analyze the eﬃcient provision and taxation of goods in two-sided
markets. We find that under both perfect competition and monopoly goods
may be over- or underprovided depending on the size and sign of the cus-
tomer group spillover eﬀects. In particular, if there are positive intergroup
spillovers, both goods will be underprovided in the competitive equilibrium.
In contrast, a monopoly platform may actually overprovide both goods. Our
analysis shows that if both sides of the market can be taxed, ad valorem and
unit taxes can be used to achieve the social optimum. However, there is an
inherent asymmetry between ad valorem and unit taxes under monopoly. In
particular, a firm always reduces output of a good which is subject to an
increased unit tax. This is the only way the firm can reduce its tax burden.
In contrast, the monopoly can raise output of a good subject to a higher ad-
valorem tax and still reduce its tax burden by lowering the end-user price.
Depending on the interrelationship between the two markets, we show that
this may be a profitable strategy for the firm. If so, it could be optimal for
the government to increase the ad-valorem tax rate if the firm produces above
the socially optimal quantity. This result diﬀers markedly from findings in
one-sided markets (e.g. Guesnerie and Laﬀont, 1978).
Our analysis is related to recent papers in Industrial Organization which
study two-sidedness (e.g. Anderson and Coate, 2005, and Rochet and Tirole,
2003, 2007). This literature, however, does not study taxation. The public
finance literature has a long tradition for investigating eﬃciency enhancing
1Evans (2003) provides examples and classifications of two-sided markets.
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taxation (see e.g. Anderson et al., 2001, and Auerbach and Hines, 2002), but
to our knowledge the issue of two-sidedness has not received any attention.
Our study seeks to remedy this oversight.
2 Model
We consider a two-sided market with two diﬀerent groups of customers, where
group i = 1, 2 buys xi units of good i at price pi. Each customer group has
a quasi-linear utility function of the form
ui = mi + φi
¡
xi, xj
¢
i 6= j and i = 1, 2,
where mi R 0 is consumption of the outside good (the numeraire good).2
For ease of exposition, we suppress the fact that i 6= j and i, j = 1, 2 in the
remainder of the text. The utility function φi (xi, xj) satisfies all the usual
conditions for utility maximization, in particular that ∂φi/∂xi ≡ φixi > 0
and φixixi < 0 (in what follows subscripts denote partial derivatives). If higher
output of good j increases (decreases) the utility from good i we have φixj > 0¡
φixj < 0
¢
.
We assume that both groups are price takers with budget constraints
ωi = mi + pixi. Maximization of the utility function subject to the budget
constraint for each group yields the inverse demand function for good i
pi
¡
xi, xj
¢
= φixi
¡
xi, xj
¢
. (1)
The profit of a monopoly platform (or of a representative platform in a
perfectly competitive market) equals
π =
2X
i=1
(pi − τ i)xi
(1 + ti)
− C
¡
xi, xj
¢
, (2)
where τ i R 0 and ti > −1 are the per unit and ad valorem tax, respectively,
on good i. The cost function C (xi, xj) ≥ 0 satisfies Cxi > 0 and Cxixi ≥ 0.
2We allow for mi < 0 so that we do not have to consider corner solutions (see Mas-
Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995).
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2.1 The social optimum
A social planner chooses output to maximize the sum of consumer surplus
minus the costs of providing the two goods. This amounts to solving
©
x1, x2
ª
= argmax
(
2X
i=1
φi
¡
xi, xj
¢
− C
¡
x1, x2
¢)
.
Given that the second-order conditions for interior solutions are satisfied, the
socially optimal quantities (marked by an asterix) are implicitly given by
pi∗ = Cxi
¡
xi∗, xj∗
¢
− φjxi
¡
xi∗, xj∗
¢
. (3)
By noting that
φjxi
¡
xi, xj
¢
=
Z xj
0
φjxixj
¡
xi, x˜j
¢
dx˜j =
Z xj
0
pjxi
¡
xi, x˜j
¢
dx˜j, (4)
we can rewrite equation (3) as
pi∗ = Cxi
¡
xi∗, xj∗
¢
−
Z xj∗
0
pjxi
¡
xi∗, x˜j
¢
dx˜j. (5)
The term
Z xj∗
0
pjxi
¡
xi∗, x˜j
¢
dx˜j in (5) measures the externality that the
marginal unit of good i imposes on the total utility of customer group j. If
this term is positive, the price of good i should be set below its marginal cost
(and vice versa for the opposite constellation).
In what follows we discuss eﬃciency enhancing taxation in the competi-
tive equilibrium as well as under monopoly. In either case it is worth pointing
out that eﬃciency can be preserved for any distribution of the tax revenue
among consumers. This is due to the quasi-linearity of the preferences.
2.2 Competitive equilibrium
A competitive firm maximizes (2) with respect to x1 and x2, taking the
end-user prices as given. In absence of taxes (ti = τ i = 0) this yields the
first-order condition for good i
pi
¡
xi, xj
¢
= Cxi
¡
xi, xj
¢
. (6)
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Equation (6) shows that under perfect competition, each platform firm
fails to account for the spillover in demand between the two goods. Depend-
ing on the sign of these spillovers, there will consequently be underprovision
or overprovision of x1 and x2 relative to the first-best allocation. Market fail-
ure in provision can be corrected for by levying appropriate pigovian taxes,
and it suﬃces to use either ad valorem or unit taxes. By comparing the
two conditions in (5) to (6), we see that the competitive equilibrium yields
first-best output if the per-unit pigovian tax scheme is characterized by
τ i∗ = −
Z xj∗
0
pjxi
¡
xi∗, x˜j
¢
dx˜j, t1 = t2 = 0. (7)
Alternatively, the government can use solely pigovian ad valorem taxes to
achieve first-best outputs:
ti∗ = −
Z xj∗
0
pjxi
¡
xi∗, x˜j
¢
dx˜j
Cxi
, τ 1 = τ 2 = 0. (8)
In both cases the sign of the optimal pigovian tax of good i is equal to
the sign of the externality it imposes on the buyers of good j. If there are
positive spillovers between the groups
¡
pixj > 0, i = 1, 2
¢
, both goods will be
underprovided in the competitive equilibrium. A first-best solution can then
be obtained by appropriately subsidizing the production of both goods.
3 Monopoly
Under imperfect competition the firms’ price setting behavior on the two
sides of the market may at least partially internalize demand spillovers. In
order to abstract from strategic interactions, we only consider a monopoly
platform. Let us again start out by considering the equilibrium if none of
the goods are taxed. Diﬀerentiating (2) w.r.t. x1 and x2 and using (1), the
platform’s first-order conditions are now:
pi
¡
xi, xj
¢
+ xipixi
¡
xi, xj
¢
= Cxi
¡
xi, xj
¢
− xjpjxi
¡
xi, xj
¢
. (9)
Compared to the first-order conditions in the competitive equilibrium
there are two additional terms under monopoly. The first of these appears
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on the left-hand side of equation (9) and is well known; by selling one ex-
tra unit of good i, the platform will have to reduce the price of good i by¯¯
pixi (x
i, xj)
¯¯
units. This generates a revenue loss equal to
¯¯
xipixi (x
i, xj)
¯¯
.
Taken in isolation, this term implies underprovision of commodity i due to
monopoly pricing.
The last term on the right-hand side of equation (9) is also new compared
to the competitive equilibrium. It captures the fact that a marginally higher
output of good i increases the willingness to pay for good j by pjxi (x
i, xj)
units, generating extra income equal to xjpjxi (x
i, xj) . This reduces the alter-
native cost of producing good i if pjxi > 0, and acts like a reduction in the
marginal costs of producing the good. Thereby the monopolist internalizes
the intergroup externalities, but not perfectly so from a social point of view.
To clarify this, we use equations (5) and (9) to define the diﬀerence in the
spillovers internalized by the monopolist and the social planner as
Ωj ≡ xjpjxi −
Z xj
0
pjxidx˜
j. (10)
The sign of Ωj is in general ambiguous, showing that the monopolist
may put higher weight on intergroup externalities than what a social plan-
ner would do.3 The reason is that the monopolist accounts for how a larger
output of good i aﬀects the willingness to pay for the marginal unit of good j,
while a social planner also cares for the change in the valuation for inframar-
ginal units. Suppose, for instance, that the externalities are positive (pjxi > 0)
and that pjxi is increasing in x
j. In this case the value of the externality is
smaller on average than it is for the marginal unit,
Z xj
0
pjxidx˜
j/xj < pjxi ,
implying that Ωj > 0.4
The fact that Ωj might be positive opens up the interesting possibility
that the monopolist has too high output compared to the social optimum
3It is straightforward to give examples where Ωi may be positive or negative.
4Note that this outcome resembles the result that a monopolist may oversupply quality
compared to what a social planner would do for any given output. To see the analogy we
may interpret a higher output of good i as having the eﬀect of increasing the perceived
quality of good j if pjxi > 0. Thus, we may perceive the monopolist as choosing a too high
quality level of good j (i.e., producing too much of good i) if the marginal willingness
to pay for the ”quality improvement” is higher than the increased average valuation (e.g.
Tirole, 1988, pp. 100-104, Spence, 1975).
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even if there are positive intergroup externalities. To see this, suppose that
xi is exogenously given. Then there is a one-to-one relationship between pj
and xj. Assuming that xi = xi∗, it follows from equations (5) and (9) that
xj > xj∗ if pj < pj∗, or
Ωi + xjpjxj > 0. (11)
We shall say that the monopoly has an overprovision incentive of good
j if inequality (11) holds, while it has an underprovision incentive if the
inequality is reversed. In what follows we examine how the government can
use tax policy to correct for such over- and underprovision incentives. We
start out by examining a case where the government only taxes one side of
the market.
3.1 Only one good taxed
In a two-sided market a government will in general need two tax instruments
to ensure that the monopolist provides the socially optimal outputs. How-
ever, the government can still use tax policy to improve resource allocation
even if it taxes only one side of the market with either ad valorem or unit
taxes.
3.1.1 Ad valorem taxes
Suppose that only good 1 is taxed. With an ad-valorem tax (and no unit
taxes) we have
π =
x1p1
1 + t1
+ x2p2 − C(x1, x2).
Maximization of profit yields the following first-order conditions
πx1 =
p1 + x1p1x1
1 + t1
+ x2p2x1 − Cx1 = 0 (12)
πx2 =
x1p1x2
1 + t1
+ p2 + x2p2x2 − Cx2 = 0. (13)
and the second-order conditions require
H = πx1x1πx2x2 − π2x1x2 > 0, πx1x1 < 0 and πx2x2 < 0.
Taking the total diﬀerential of the first-order conditions yields:
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dx1
dt1
=
−πx2x2
¡
x2p2x1 − Cx1
¢
H (1 + t1)
+
1
(1 + t1)2
−πx1x2x1p1x2
H
(14)
dx2
dt1
=
πx1x2
¡
x2p2x1 − Cx1
¢
H (1 + t1)
+
1
(1 + t1)2
πx1x1x1p1x2
H
(15)
In order to have a two sided market, there must be positive externalities
from at least one side of the market to the other.5 The implication of this is
that pixj > 0 for at least one good. The interesting feature of equations (14)
and (15) is that a higher value-added tax on good 1 may increase output of
both goods. To illustrate this possibility, assume that the following holds:
Example: Suppose that; (a) p2x1 > 0 and p
1
x2 = 0; (b)
¡
x2p2x1 − Cx1
¢
> 0,
and; (c) πx1x2 > 0.
With assumption (a) in the Example the willingness to pay for good 2
is increasing in the sales of good 1 (p2x1 > 0), while consumers of good 1 are
indiﬀerent about the output level of good 2 (p1x2 = 0). The latter implies
that the last term on the right-hand side of (14) and (15) vanishes. We then
have dx1/dt1 > 0 and dx2/dt1 > 0 if assumptions (b) and (c) hold.6
We thus see that a higher value-added tax might lead to higher sales,
contrary to what is the standard result in one-sided markets. The reason is
that a higher tax on good 1 makes it profitable for the firm to shift revenue
from the more heavily taxed to the untaxed side of the market (good 2). To
see why this induces the platform to increase production in the Example,
note that a marginally higher output of good 1 increases the willingness to
pay for good 2 by p2x1 units. This gives rise to an extra income equal to x
2p2x1.
With our assumption that
¡
x2p2x1 − Cx1
¢
> 0, the income gain is higher than
the marginal cost of producing good 1. This explains why dx1/dt1 > 0. Since
we further have presupposed that the marginal profitability of selling good 2
5See Evans (2003a,b) for an informal definition of two-sidedness and Rochet and Tirole
(2003) for a formal definition.
6The condition (b)
¡
x2p2x1 − Cx1
¢
> 0 is unambiguously satisfied for Cx1 = 0. This is
particularly likely for electronic communications services. Consider for instance an internet
newspaper which sells its product to x1 readers and has an advertising volume equal to x2.
A larger number of readers increases the advertisers willingness to pay for inserting an ad
(generating an extra platform income equal to x2p2x1). Since the marginal cost of increasing
the number of readers is approximately equal to zero, we have
¡
x2p2x1 − Cx1
¢
≈ x2p2x1 > 0.
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is increasing in output of good 1 (∂πx2/∂x1 = πx1x2 > 0), it follows directly
that dx2/dt1 > 0.
Note that the results which follow from the example are strengthened if
we relax the assumption p1x2 = 0 to p
1
x2 ≤ 0, and that they survive at least
in the neighborhood of p1x2 = 0 if there are positive intergroup externalities
across both customer groups. Hence, assumption (a) is not crucial. Neither is
assumption (c), in that we still have dx1/dt1 > 0 even if πx1x2 < 0. However,
since πx1x2 < 0 implies that the marginal profitability of good 2 is decreasing
in x1, it follows that dx2/dt1 < 0. In this case we therefore get the interesting
result that output of the good which is subject to a higher tax increases while
output of the untaxed good falls.7
We shall now see what implications equations (14) and (15) have for the
optimal tax policy. To this end, define welfare as the sum of consumer surplus
(Si), producer surplus (π), and tax revenue (T );
W = φ1
¡
x1, x2
¢
− x1p1| {z }
S1
+ φ2
¡
x1, x2
¢
− x2p2| {z }
S2
+ π + T, (16)
where T is defined as
T =
t1
1 + t1
x1p1.
Diﬀerentiating consumer surplus, profit and tax revenue with respect to t1
and using the envelope theorem we obtain8
dSi
dt1
= −Ωidx
j
dt1
− xipixi
dxi
dt1
;
dπ
dt1
= − x
1p1
(1 + t1)2
and (17)
dT
dt1
=
x1p1
(1 + t1)2
+
t1
1 + t1
∙¡
p1 + x1p1x1
¢ dx1
dt1
+ x1p1x2
dx2
dt1
¸
.
With only one tax instrument it is generally not possible to achieve so-
cially optimal outputs. However, by solving dW/dt1 = 0 and assuming that
the second-order conditions hold, we find that a second-best equilibrium can
7The price of good 2 will then rise, both because own quantity falls and because output
of good 1 increases. See Kind, Koethenbuerger and Schjelderup (2006) for a detailed
discussion of the sign of πx1x2 and of how the strength and size of the externalities aﬀect
output responses to a tax increase.
8If the platform’s first-order conditions yield an interior solution we have π =
π(x1(t1), x2(t1), t1), so that dπ/dt1 = ∂π/∂t1.
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be obtained by setting the tax rate equal to
tˆ1
1 + tˆ1
=
³
Ωˆ1 + xˆ2pˆ2x2
´
dxˆ2
dt1 +
³
Ωˆ2 + xˆ1pˆ1x1
´
dxˆ1
dt1¡
pˆ1 + xˆ1pˆ1x1
¢
dxˆ1
dt1 + xˆ
1pˆ1x2
dxˆ2
dt1
, (18)
where the hat indicates that we consider equilibrium values (and derivatives
evaluated at the equilibrium values).
Using the assumptions in the Example we can now sign the optimal tax
rate in (18) as follows:9
tˆ1
1 + tˆ1
=
−z }| {
xˆ2pˆ2x2
+z}|{
dxˆ2
dt1
+
³
Ωˆ2 + xˆ1pˆ1x1
´ +z}|{dxˆ1
dt1¡
pˆ1 + xˆ1pˆ1x1
¢| {z }
−
dx1
dt1|{z}
+
. (19)
Suppose that
³
Ωˆ2 + xˆ1pˆ1x1
´
< 0. Other things equal the monopoly then
has incentives to underprovide good 1. In order to correct for this, we see from
equation (19) that the government must set a positive tax ( tˆ1 > 0). Thereby
it induces the monopoly to increase production. A positive tax is warranted
also if
³
Ωˆ2 + xˆ1pˆ1x1
´
> 0 but not high enough to make the numerator in
(19) positive. The reason why tˆ1 > 0 in this case is that the monopoly
always underprovides good 2 in absence of taxes (since a higher output of
this good does not generate higher income on the other side of the market
when p1x2 = 0). Thus, the fact that dx
2/dt1 > 0 makes it optimal to set a
positive tax rate unless the overprovision incentive for good 1 is suﬃciently
high.
3.1.2 Unit taxes
In this section we assume that there are no ad valorem taxes and that the
unit tax only falls on good 1. Profits can then be written as
π = x1
¡
p1 − τ 1
¢
+ x2p2 − C(x1, x2)
9From equation (12) we see that assumption (b) in the example implies that¡
p1 + x1p1x1
¢
< 0.
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Maximizing profit yields the first order conditions
πx1 = p1 − τ 1 + x1p1x1 + x2p2x1 − Cx1 = 0 (20)
πx2 = x1p1x2 + p
2 + x2p2x2 − Cx2 = 0. (21)
The second order conditions are the same as under ad valorem taxation,
and totally diﬀerentiating (20) and (21) we find
dx1
dτ 1
=
πx2x2
H
< 0
dx2
dτ 1
= −πx1x2
H
. (22)
As in a one-sided market, we see that a higher specific tax on a good
leads to lower output of that good. This simply reflects the fact that an
increase in τ 1 is like an increase in the marginal costs of producing good
1. If the marginal profit of selling good 2 is increasing in output of good
1 (πx1x2 > 0), the reduced output of good 1 further makes it optimal to
reduce output of good 2 (dx2/dτ 1 < 0). Otherwise the firm’s tax burden will
increase. We thus have an asymmetry between unit taxes and ad-valorem
taxes; as shown above it might be optimal for the firm to increase output of
a good which is subject to higher ad-valorem taxes.
Welfare is still given by (16), but tax revenue is now equal to T = τx1.
We also have a similar expression for the changes in consumer surplus as
under ad valorem taxation, that is:
dS1
dτ 1
= −Ω1dx
2
dτ 1
− x1p1x1
dx1
dτ 1
and
dS2
dτ 1
= −Ω2dx
1
dτ 1
− x2p2x2
dx2
dτ 1
. (23)
For the changes in profits and tax revenue we have:
dπ
dτ 1
= −x1, dT
dτ 1
= x1 + τ 1
dx1
dτ 1
.
Using this information in the expressions for change in welfare we find that
dW/dτ 1 = 0 implies
τˆ 1 =
∙³
Ωˆ1 + xˆ2pˆ2x2
´ dxˆ2
dτ 1
+
³
Ωˆ2 + xˆ1pˆ1x1
´ dxˆ1
dτ 1
¸ ∙
dxˆ1
dτ 1
¸−1
. (24)
With the assumptions in the Example we have dx1/dτ 1 < 0 and dx2/dτ 1 <
0. If the monopoly has underprovision incentives for both goods (Ωˆi+xˆj pˆjxj <
0), we thus see that the government should subsidize production in order to
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increase output, while it is optimal to tax production if Ωˆi+ xˆj pˆjxj > 0. These
results are in accordance with insight from traditional tax analysis. Only if
there exists an overprovision incentive for one good and an underprovision
incentive for the other is the sign of the specific tax ambiguous.
3.2 Taxation of both goods
The government can achieve first-best outputs under monopoly by appropri-
ately choosing unit or ad valorem taxes. Setting t1 = t2 = 0, it follows from
equation (2) that the platform’s first-order conditions in the presence of only
unit taxes are equal to
pi
¡
xi, xj
¢
= τ i − xipixi
¡
xi, xj
¢
− xjpjxi
¡
xi, xj
¢
+ Cxi
¡
xi, xj
¢
. (25)
Equating the monopolist’s equilibrium prices with those of a social planner
(c.f. equation (5)), it follows that the optimal unit taxes are given by10
τ i∗ = Ωj∗ + xi∗pi∗xi. (26)
The intuition behind equation (26) is straightforward; the specific tax on
good i should be positive (negative) if the monopoly otherwise oversupplies
(undersupplies) the good.
The government can also reproduce the first best solution by use of ad
valorem taxes. Setting τ 1 = τ 2 = 0, we find that the firm’s first-order
conditions equal
πx1 = 0 =>
p1 + x1p1x1
1 + t1
+
x2p2x1
1 + t2
− Cx1 = 0 (27)
πx2 = 0 =>
x1p1x2
1 + t1
+
p2 + x2p2x2
1 + t2
− Cx2 = 0. (28)
Using the same procedure as under unit taxes, it can be shown that the
optimal ad valorem taxes that reproduce the first-best output levels are
ti∗ =
¡
pj∗ + xj∗pj∗xj
¢ ¡
Ωj∗ + xi∗pi∗xi
¢
− xj∗pj∗xi
¡
Ωi∗ + xj∗pj∗xj
¢¡
pj∗ + xj∗pj∗xj
¢
C∗xi − xj∗p
j∗
xiC
∗
xj
. (29)
10Recall, variables marked by an asterix denote first-best allocations.
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In order to see that it may be optimal to set a positive tax on good 1 if it
is otherwise overproduced and vice versa, we continue to use the assumptions
specified in the Example. From (29) we then find
t1∗ =
+z }| {¡
p2∗ + x2∗p2∗x2
¢ ¡
Ω2∗ + x1∗p1∗x1
¢
+
+z }| {
(x2∗)2p2∗x1
¡
−p2∗x2
¢¡
p2∗ + x2∗p2∗x2
¢
C∗x1| {z }
+
+
¡
−x2∗p2∗x1C∗x2
¢| {z }
−
(30)
t2∗ =
x2∗p2∗x2
C∗x2
< 0.
Given the assumption p1x2 = 0 the monopoly does not have any external-
ities to internalize when it decides the output level of good 2 . Totally
diﬀerentiating first-order conditions (27) and (28) we therefore find that
dx2
dt2 = −
p2+x2p2
x2
(1+t2)2
³
−πx2x2
H
´
< 0, similar to what we would have in a one-
sided market. Since the good in absence of taxes is undersupplied compared
to social optimum, we consequently get the standard result that t2∗ < 0.
Whether also t1∗ is negative depends on the sizes of
¡
Ω2∗ + x1∗p1∗x1
¢
and
C∗x1.
11 To see why, suppose in accordance with the assumptions in the Exam-
ple that the marginal costs of producing good I are “low”. We then know that
dx1/dt1 > 0.12 If the firm otherwise overproduces good 1 (Ω2∗+ x1∗p1∗x1 > 0),
the government would like the firm to produce less of it. This can be achieved
by setting a negative tax rate (t1∗ < 0).13 If the underprovision incentive for
good 1 is suﬃciently strong (Ω2∗+x1∗p1∗x1 << 0), on the other hand, it is opti-
mal for the government to set t1 > 0. This positive tax induces the monopoly
to produce more of good 1. Note that these results are qualitatively equiva-
lent to those we arrived at when only Good 1 was taxed.
Finally, it should be noted that the crucial assumption in our working
example is that (x2p2x1 − Cx1) > 0; the assumptions that πx1x2 > 0 and
11Note that with t2 < 0 and x2p2x1 − Cx1 > 0 we have
¡
p1 + x1p1x1
¢
< 0. This follows
from the first-order condition (27).
12With two ad valorem taxes the quantity response is equivalent to equation (14) except
that p2x1 has to be replaced by
1
1+t2 p
2
x1 . In this case assumption (b) reads
1
1+t2x
2p2x1−Cx1 .
13When
¡
Ω2 + x1p1x1
¢
> 0 and Cx1 is “small” the numerator in (30) is positive and the
denominator negative.
13
p1x2 = 0 are made only to verify as simply as possible that output responses
to a higher tax and the sign of the optimal taxes may be the opposite of those
we typically find in one-sided markets. If in contrast (x2p2x1 − Cx1) < 0, tax
responses are more likely to be qualitatively similar in one-sided and two-
sided markets. This makes intuitive sense, since the two-sidedness is then
not very pronounced.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that in absense of taxes, a monopoly platform
in a two-sided market may have too high outputs compared to the social
optimum. We have also identified situations where higher value-added taxes
increase output, such that a negative VAT rate (subsidy) may be warranted
if the monopoly otherwise produces too much. These results are in sharp
contrast to those we typically find in one-sided markets, and they are more
probable the smaller the marginal production costs and the larger the mar-
ginal value of the externalility of a taxed good. Through a formal analysis
we have further demonstrated that the signs of the optimal VAT rates may
be the opposite to those of the optimal specific taxes. In particular, while
a higher VAT rate in some cases increases output, the monopoly will always
produce less of a good that faces a higher specific tax. The reason is that
there is a one-to-one relationship between tax payments and quantity under
specific taxes, while there is no direct link between output and the burden
of taxation under ad valorem taxation. In fact, subsequent to a higher ad
valorem tax the firm can in principle both reduce tax payments and increase
the quantity by lowering the price.
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